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STATEMENT ON SECURITY RESEARCH 
 
This research was performed with local software simulation on hardware that was not 
connected to the Internet.  All testing was performed within Java objects that only 
communicated with one another on one computer.  No simulation between hardware 
devices was tested during this research. 
 
This research was performed for purely academic reasons to study the security of data 
caching networks and a possible new attack vector.  UNF does not promote the use of any 
attack outside of an approved testing environment designed for computer research.  This 
research discusses the possibility of using this new attack on real world networks and what 
the effects of the attack would be.  Any further research on this topic should be done locally 
and never used against live networks or computers not owned by the tester.  Future research 
is promoted in this paper on the topic of finding methods to detect and prevent such data 
caching attacks in the future. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
With the rise of data exchange over the Internet, information-centric networks have become 
a popular research topic in computing.  One major research topic on Information Centric 
Networks (ICN) is the use of data caching to increase network performance. However, 
research in the security concerns of data caching networks is lacking.  One example of a 
data caching network can be seen using a Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET).  
 
Recently, a study has shown that it is possible to infer military activity through cache 
behavior which is used as a basis for a formulated denial of service attack (DoS) that can 
be used to attack networks using data caching.  Current security issues with data caching 
networks are discussed, including possible prevention techniques and methods.  A targeted 
data cache DoS attack is developed and tested using an ICN as a simulator. The goal of the 
attacker would be to fill node caches with unpopular content, thus making the cache 
useless.  The attack would consist of a malicious node that requests unpopular content in 
intervals of time where the content would have been just purged from the existing cache.  
The goal of the attack would be to corrupt as many nodes as possible without increasing 
the chance of detection.  The decreased network throughput and increased delay would also 
lead to higher power consumption on the mobile nodes, thus increasing the effects of the 
DoS attack.  
 
xiii 
Various caching polices are evaluated in an ICN simulator program designed to show 
network performance using three common caching policies and various cache sizes.  The 
ICN simulator is developed using Java and tested on a simulated network.  Baseline data 
are collected and then compared to data collected after the attack.  Other possible security 
concerns with data caching networks are also discussed, including possible smarter attack 
techniques and methods.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet has grown in the 21th century to become the main source of communication 
and data exchange. The rise in mobile smart phone usage has also increased the amount of 
data exchange and the number of people requesting content. Examples of content include 
documents, videos, images, audio, and metadata.  As technology continues to get better, 
the byte size of the data also continues to increase.  For example a standard definition video 
which, has an average resolution of 480p.  A standard DVD disc can hold up to 4GB of 
data, which displays video in 480p resolution.  Many popular cameras and video cameras 
in 2014 are capable of shooting videos in high definition, or 1080p resolution.  A standard 
Blu-Ray disc can hold up to 50GB of data, which displays video in 1080p resolution.  
Similar types of file size increases can be seen with higher resolution images as technology 
continues to develop.  With more people capturing large multimedia there comes a need to 
present this media quickly, and keep the high quality for remote users.  The rise in 
technology has kept to “Moore’s Law” in doubling of technical capacity every two years 
[Schaller97], but many researchers suggest that the network technology is not keeping to 
the law [Coffman02].   
 
Data or content caching was used as a way to increase the performance of data exchange 
over the network.  Many peer-to-peer and mobile networks require data caching to increase 
network performance while providing the most energy efficient solution.  To reduce the 
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amount of network traffic and help solve any issues related to the geographic distance of 
client and server data exchange, Content Delivery Network (CDN) architectures were put 
in place in heavy metropolitan areas.  Content Delivery Networks place caching servers on 
the edge of networks so requests can be served in geographical proximity to users.  Another 
networking architecture, Named Data Networking (NDN), has also been proposed where 
data caching would be done on routers.  This type of network would require existing routers 
to be upgraded to faster and much more expensive hardware.   
 
Network security has become a very popular topic in the world of computing since the 
invention and rise of the Internet.  The Internet structure itself allowed for many security 
vulnerabilities to occur between remote computers.  Research on the Internet (its 
vulnerabilities, attack methods, and security technology) has become a vital necessity to 
maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of personal and corporate assets. 
Technologies such as firewalls and other security devices and methods allow for businesses 
to be protected within an “intranet” but still have the availability to connect to the Internet. 
Other security devices such as Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) allow security 
professionals to monitor and actively defend against security threats.  Security research 
allows for such devices and methods to stay up to date on the latest vulnerabilities and 
attack methods.  Newly found and evaluated vulnerabilities and methods allow for security 
devices and professionals to accurately detect and prevent such issues in the future. 
[Daya13] 
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1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Data caching networks, such as an ICN, rely on the use of caching to increase network 
performance by minimizing the number of hops for given requests.  As mentioned, many 
different networks have been created and researched to solve the problem of fast data 
exchange.  ICNs have also introduced a new way to find content, based on the content data 
itself instead of an IP centric or host to host model [Brito13].  A main component of 
ensuring high performance in data exchange on networks is “data caching”.  Many 
companies and researchers use load testing to benchmark network limitations and show 
that data caching can greatly improve network performance [Bžoch12].  But what are the 
security implications of attacking the data cache itself?  As shown in Chapter 2, security 
research is lacking in the field of data caching networks and attacks targeted at cache 
pollution.  This thesis aims to show and discuss the security issues arising from attacking 
the use of data caching within networks and proposes a new type of DoS attack. 
 
Any gap in research and knowledge can lead to possible security vulnerabilities that may 
not be well known until exploited.  Take, for example, zero day attacks that use methods 
and vulnerabilities that are not known by the attacked company or technology until they 
are used against them.  The recent vulnerability discovered in SSLv3 protocol is a perfect 
example of vulnerabilities that exist in the world today that are not known until research or 
live attacks are performed.  These types of threats can be minimized by security research, 
testing, and general awareness.  Data caching network security currently lacks an in-depth 
look at security attacks targeting the use of data caching and thus presents a problem.   
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1.2 Contributions 
 
With the growing dependence on data caching within networks, a new DoS threat can be 
formed that targets the use of data caching strategies.  The new creative and adaptive 
method targets the goals of data caching and uses prior research on inferring network traffic 
from data cache behavior [Dehghan13].  This targeted DoS attack would prove to decrease 
network throughput and increase network delay.  This method is defined, implemented, 
and tested on a data caching network simulator.  The scalability of the attack 
implementation is tested across 3 network topologies ranging in size from 5 nodes to 8,846 
nodes.  The attack implementation is also tested across 3 caching strategies and 5 different 
cache sizes per node.  The network simulator was developed to test an ICN using custom 
object oriented classes that were developed to evaluate the new attack implementation.  The 
network simulator software was developed to test a network using software testing limited 
to the local machine.  No network hardware or external computers were used in the 
simulator testing.  Three different caching strategies were also tested in the simulator using 
a Java implementation of the DoS attack.  The scope of the research is limited to internal 
attacks.  For internal attacks, it is assumed that an internal node in the network has already 
been compromised.  No details are provided on how this node was compromised, nor will 
the security implications of attacks not related to data caching be discussed.  This new 
attack and discussion of security issues concerning data caching networks aims to open up 
more research and awareness in the field of computer security. 
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Chapter 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Background 
 
In this chapter, various concepts and technologies that relate to a DoS attack on data 
caching networks are discussed and defined.  The main topics include network 
technologies, data caching, and computer security.  A defined understanding of these topics 
and terminology will be needed to fully understand the proposed new attack method.   
 
2.1.1 Information Centric Networks (ICN) 
 
The most widely used networks today are host centric networks that use an IP address route 
requests.  Requests are bound to a physical geographic location that all requests must 
communicate to and from.  Information or content centric networks aim to change this 
paradigm to a data-based approach for delivering content.  This networking approach 
allows for faster information access regardless of location. For example, a user requests a 
video to download.  The router takes this request, searches nearby hosts for this content, 
and routes the request to the closest host with that content to serve the request. The history 
of ICNs come from content delivery systems such as publish/subscribe architectures and 
peer-to-peer networks where the main goal was content dissemination.   
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Key differences between ICNs and host centric networks include naming, routing, security, 
and API.  ICNs give names to unique pieces of content instead of giving names to hosts.  
Routing is performed by routing requests between a client requester and optimal content 
sources.  Host centric networks route requests between source and destination nodes that 
are identified using a physical geographic location on the network with an IP address.  
Packet headers are used to send chunks of data, hop by hop, from the browser to the server 
and back.  The packet headers contain the IP address which describes the location of the 
destination to all routers so they know where to forward the request [Brito13].  Clearly, if 
the end destination server is not geographically located near the client, the request could 
take some time to complete as it needs to travel from router to router, possibly across the 
globe.  Security in host centric networks focus on having a secure communication channel 
between source and destination hosts.  ICNs secure the integrity of the content itself and 
make sure it is not altered regardless of how the content is delivered. APIs exposed by 
ICNs create methods that allow for content to be published and consumed, whereas host 
centric networks allow data to be sent to given physical geographic locations [Tyson13]. 
 
 
2.1.2 Peer-to-Peer Networks 
 
The roots of ICNs are found in the early peer-to-peer networks that allowed for a new and 
unique way to send and receive data.  Peer-to-peer networks are a form of network 
architecture in which host computers send and receive data from one another without the 
need to go to a separate server. Each computer acts as both a client and a server in a peer-
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to-peer network.  A good definition of peer-to-peer systems was proposed by 
Androutsellis-Theotokis in 2004 [Androutsellis-Theotokis04],  
Peer-to-peer systems are distributed systems consisting of interconnected 
nodes able to self-organize into network topologies with the purpose of 
sharing resources such as content, CPU cycles, storage and bandwidth, 
capable of adapting to failures and accommodating transient populations 
of nodes while maintaining acceptable connectivity and performance, 
without requiring the intermediation or support of a global centralized 
server or authority. 
The most widely known and used peer-to-peer systems are used for sharing content, which 
first became popular with Napster.  Napster was forced to shut down after violating the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  Shortly after that time, a file sharing protocol, Bit 
Torrent, became very popular and heavily used.  The Bit Torrent protocol [Pouwelse05] 
“splits files into chunks and the downloaders of a file barter for chunks of it by uploading 
and downloading them.  When a peer has finished downloading a file, it may become a 
seed by staying online and sharing the file.”  Users looking to download files must find a 
Bit Torrent web site that hosts directories of available files, called torrent files.  The torrent 
file contains information on what tracker to use to download this file.  The trackers 
[Pouwelse05] “keep a global registry of all the downloaders and seeds” of the given file. 
As seen, this protocol still relies on some servers in between the peers in order to share 
files across a network. 
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2.1.3 MANET 
 
Over the years, many different peer-to-peer networks have been created that focused on 
fixed peer computers.  A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) aims to benefit from the 
advantages of peer-to-peer while using highly mobile peer computers.  A MANET is made 
up of mobile hosts, or peers, that use a store-and-forward method to send and receive 
packets on the network via a wireless network connection.  Since the nodes are mobile, all 
changes in physical location must be communicated to the entire MANET network so every 
node can update its network topology.  The distance between the nodes also must be taken 
into consideration.  If a mobile node is using a battery instead of a directly connected power 
source, then the node must see if the remaining battery power has enough power to send 
data to a node.  It is possible that a node with a low battery may only be able to send data 
to a node very close to its physical location. In the original MANET networks, only the 
routes were cached for faster read and write access [de Morais Cordeiro02]. 
 
2.1.4 Gnutella 
 
Another example of a peer-to-peer network topology that was used heavily in large scale 
deployments was Gnutella.  Gnutella is an unstructured and decentralized peer-to-peer 
network that became popular in the early 2000s.  The Gnutella topology was more robust 
and self-healing compared to other peer-to-peer topologies due to the lack of structure and 
decentralization.  It was the first decentralized peer-to-peer network of its kind, which lead 
to many new network topologies since that time.  The Gnutella topology was used heavily 
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with peer-to-peer file sharing clients such as Limewire.  Research in Gnutella showed that 
the topology was scalable, which was needed for the file sharing peer-to-peer services that 
grew heavily in popularity with services like Limewire [Chandra10]. 
 
2.1.5 Hybrid Networks 
 
Many devices have been produced with support for multiple communication technologies.  
A simple smart phone sold in 2015 would have the ability to connect to other devices using 
the cellular network, WIFI, Bluetooth and even RFID or NFC (Near Field 
Communication).  Deploying a MANET network using devices such as current generation 
smart phones would allow for the use of a hybrid network.  A Hybrid MANET network 
can be seen as a MANET network where certain nodes (or all nodes) have the ability to 
use another nearby existing network for communication.   
Take a simple example of troops deployed to foreign countries.  Each troop would be 
equipped with a communication device to make sure they can connect to all nearby troops.  
With the rise in use of cellular networks, there would be a strong possibility that the 
deployment location has a nearby cellular tower.  Troops could then use that existing 
network to pass information between squads by using the cellular network regardless of 
physical geographic proximity.  This would allow for much faster communication and data 
transfer than having to use satellite communication devices.  If a General was in one 
location and gave out new orders or vital documents, the data could be transferred to all 
nearby troops using the MANET network, then passed to other squads using the cellular 
network. The same example could be used for troops requesting new information.  The 
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request would be made within the MANET network and if it wasn’t on the network, the 
backup cellular network could be used. 
 
2.1.6 Content Centric Networking / Named-Data Networking 
 
One form of ICN architectures is Content Centric Networking (CCN).  Named content is 
the main component of content centric networking.  The most distinguishing feature of 
CCN is the ability to divide content into chunks so that each chunk has a unique name, 
ordered identifier, and can be requested individually.  There are two different types of 
packets in CCN: interest packets (I-packet) and data packets (D-packet).  An interest packet 
is a packet that contains information on a certain chunk of content and information on the 
node with interest (the requester).  The interest packet is then broadcasted on the network 
until a node is found with the specific chunk of content.  If a node receives an interest 
packet and does not have the content stored locally, it forwards the interest packet to its 
neighbors until a node that has stored the requested data is found. The data packet is then 
sent back to the requester in response to the interest packet.  Routers in CCNs use a content 
store (CS) to store content on the router using a caching policy such as least recently used 
(LRU).  These routers also contain a pending interest table (PIT) and a forwarding 
information base (FIB).  The PIT is used as a routing table to store interest packets that 
have been forwarded.  This allows for data packets to be sent back correctly in response.  
The FIB is a database that stores the mapping between the content names and the output 
interface. See Figure 1 for an overview of a CCN node [Brito13]. 
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Figure 1: Overview of Content Centric Networking Node 
 
NDN is a popular design architecture that implements content centric networking.  It uses 
both interest and data packets as required by content centric networks (Using NDN 
notation, a “/” separates name components and fragments are created by adding another “/” 
and adding the fragment identifier).  For example, fragment 3 of Jeff.jpg could be named 
/facebook/gougejeff/2014/photos/Jeff.jpg/3.  Figure 2 shows an overview of NDN 
including the interest packet request and the received data packet [Conti13]. 
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Figure 2: Named Data Networking Overview 
 
2.1.7 Caching 
 
Caching is a concept of storing data in memory to allow for faster data access.  Routers 
implement route caching of routing tables to allow for faster querying.  Web servers are 
also known for using caching to store web pages and multimedia.  There are many different 
caching policies that are used, and each has advantages and disadvantages. 
 
LRU or Least Recently Used caching policy is a commonly used caching policy [Bžoch12].   
It allows for storing of the most recently used content, and data are purged from the cache 
using a strategy given by its name.  Items are removed from LRU cache when the cache 
hits its maximum size and the item that was least recently used by that cache is removed 
from the cache.  LRU tends to be one of the best caching solutions for caching of large files 
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[Bžoch12].  It is usually implemented using a priority queue, which using the last access 
timestamp as the priority.  FIFO (First in First out) is another type of caching policy.  Items 
are placed and removed from this type of cache based on a queuing strategy.  Items placed 
into the cache are put into the tail or back of the queue and once its maximum size is 
reached, the item at the head or front of the queue is removed.  Random cache is another 
caching strategy where items are place into the cache at the start of a list.  When the 
maximum size is reached, a random index of that list is removed and the new item is put 
into that index [Bžoch12]. 
 
A form of caching content in different geographic locations can be seen in content delivery 
networks (CDN).  The CDN is essentially just a collection of servers that store local copies 
of specific content on servers located strategically across the Internet.  Content providers 
such as Netflix, Youtube and other companies use commercial CDNs to offload content 
hosting responsibility and allow for very high availability of content all over the world 
[Saroiu02].  Each CDN server can be seen as a data caching server that would serve 
requests for content instead of forwarding the request to the host.  
 
 
2.1.8 Computer Security 
 
In recent history, some of the most popular news stories surrounding the field of computing 
have been security related incidents.  Every year, a number of large companies are affected 
by computer security incident(s) that lead to large data loss and sometimes business 
closures.  The common core principles of information security are confidentiality, integrity, 
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and availability, which is commonly referred to as CIA.  Confidentiality refers to ensuring 
that best practices and methods are used to ensure all information is only available to those 
who have the need, or the right, to see it.  The integrity of a computing system is described 
as the prevention of unauthorized or improper modification of systems or information.  The 
accuracy of data is very important, especially in systems that have dependences on the 
correctness of that data to make decisions and take actions.  Availability refers to 
prevention of disruptions in service or productivity.  The main goal of information security 
is to ensure each of these principles for all company assets including physical and 
informational assets [Hernandez09]. 
 
As technology changes every day, an increasing amount of security vulnerabilities are 
found in developer code.  The most popular security attacks are targeted at remote servers 
and applications available on the Internet, which lead to web developers code being the 
most often attacked.  Every year, the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 
produces a top 10 list of the most critical web application security risks.  The list is meant 
to be used as a resource to all developers to raise awareness of the most popular application 
security vulnerabilities and how to avoid them while developing applications.  Top attacks 
in the last couple years include: Buffer Overflow attacks, injection attacks 
(SQL/QueryString paramaters/etc.), broken authentication and session management, cross-
site scripting (XSS), using known vulnerable software components, and others [Stock13]. 
 
Attacks on application security is just one of the many attack vectors malicious users can 
target to compromise computer security.  The availability of computing resources and 
- 15 - 
applications is another commonly attacked vector in computer security.  Every day, 
malicious users throughout the world are targeting web sites and applications available on 
the Internet in an attempt to decrease performance or ultimately crash remote resources.  
This type of remote attack is called a denial of service attack (DoS).  A DoS attack can 
originate from a single source, or from multiple sources all with the same attack destination 
which is labeled a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS).  With the computing power 
available today, DDoS attacks are one of the most popular and effective ways of 
compromising the availability of remote services. 
   
There are many tools and methods for protecting computers and data from security 
vulnerabilities.  There are also many ways for securing the actual communication channel 
itself from attackers trying to take, decrypt, and change the data in route.  Tools such as 
encryption, authentication mechanisms, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and 
firewalls are all examples of security tools that work to detect and prevent threats and 
attacks.  Each of these tools depends on continuous research in order to stay current with 
new attacks and methods found in production and research environments.   
 
2.2 Known Results and Related Work 
 
There have been many research papers that discuss ICNs and caching related issues since 
heavy caching is one of the main concepts of ICN.  The main motivation of this research 
was all started from a research paper, “Inferring Military Activity in Hybrid Networks 
through Cache Behavior” by Mostafa Dehghan, Dennis L. Goeckel, Ting He, and Don 
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Towsley [Dehghan13]. The research shows that mobile hybrid networks have a 
vulnerability where military network activity can be inferred by examining the cache 
hit/miss of a single adversary node.  The paper discusses the concept of characteristic time 
(T*) which is used to describe the amount of time on average a single piece of content will 
stay in a single nodes cache.  A method is discussed on how to determine the cache size 
being used by other nodes on the network as well, which is used as a basis for determining 
the characteristic time.   
 
After taking a look at other research in this area, a gap was found in security research on 
caching.  The previous paper stated that this research field was lacking and that the paper 
had hopes of starting new research in this field.  While performing research, many papers 
on detecting attacks or vulnerabilities in networks including ICNs were found but only one 
paper was found on the details of such an attack. 
 
The paper on detecting cache pollution attacks in NDN by Mauro Conti, Paolo Gasti, and 
Marco Teoli was found as the only paper describing the feasibility of the attack [Conti13].  
This paper took a direct look at a new method of detecting cache pollution attacks, 
specifically in NDNs using concepts and methods used in this example of an ICN.  The 
paper also shows that this type of cache attack is not only viable in smaller networks, as it 
was once shown to be, but also for much larger network topologies.  The paper also 
suggests a way to improve a cache pollution attack found in a previous research paper by 
Xie et al. [Xie12].  A comparison is also used in this research paper to CacheShield [Xie12], 
which is the only known countermeasure to cache pollution attacks designed specifically 
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for NDNs.  Using the concepts found in this research, some improvements are made on the 
proposed attack method, which can be found in Chapter 4.  Also, the proposed attack is not 
targeted for NDNs, but any network architecture that uses data caching thus the detection 
methods specific to NDNs are viable.      
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Design Science 
 
Design science research is the research methodology used in this thesis.  The main goal of 
design science research is defined in its seven objectives or guidelines.  The outcome of 
design science research in Information Systems disciplines is to create solutions (artifacts) 
that have been evaluated, and to share the results of the evaluation with the community 
[Hevner04].   
 
3.2 Design Science Guidelines 
 
 
In this section, the seven design science guidelines are discussed and defined.  Each 
guideline is discussed and are used to help researchers conduct and evaluate research based 
on this methodology.  All guidelines are just guidelines and are not strictly enforced 
[Hevner04]. 
 
3.2.1 Design as an Artifact 
 
The first guideline of design science research states that an artifact must be created in the 
form of a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation [Hevner04].  A clearly stated 
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and viable artifact must be created. For this thesis, the goal is to create a working method 
and implementation of performing a DoS attack on data caching networks.  The details of 
the method is described in full detail in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2.2 Problem Relevance 
 
The objective of the problem relevance guideline is to ensure that the solution is important 
and relevant in the real world [Hevner04].  As stated in the introduction, data caching has 
become a very popular way of increasing network performance in many different networks.  
As more networks become reliant on data caching, a clear understanding of all security 
concerns need to be defined.  If attacks and prevention techniques are not researched, then 
systems could be developed with future security vulnerabilities unknown to the general 
public. The reliance of this problem is established in Chapter 1. 
 
3.2.3 Design Evaluation 
 
The design evaluation guideline states that the artifact should be demonstrated via a well-
executed evaluation method [Hevner04].  Five possible evaluation methods are 
observational, analytical, experimental, test-based, and descriptive.  Observational 
evaluation is performed via case studies or field studies where multiple solutions are 
studied and discussed.  Analytical evaluation involves performing analysis of various 
qualities of the solution.  Experimental evaluation is performed with controlled 
experiments or simulations.  Test-based evaluation is performed with the use of black-box 
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and white-box testing strategies where solutions are tested for expected results.  Descriptive 
evaluation is performed using arguments, scenarios, or discussions on the solution.  This 
thesis uses the experimental evaluation method with the simulation performed on a sample 
data caching network.  An ICN software simulator is used as a simulation baseline and 
evaluated using three different scenarios as described in Chapter 5.  
 
3.2.4 Research Contributions 
 
The research contributions guideline states that the research must contribute to the designed 
areas of expertise in a clear and verifiable way [Hevner04].  The goal of this research is to 
create a new method and implementation of a DoS attack on data caching networks.  The 
attack method created can be used to affect many devices that makes use of a data cache 
including routers, CDNs, webservers, and other hardware devices.  A software ICN 
simulator was also developed to evaluate the DoS attack implementation.  This artifact 
contributes to the overall security research field by providing a new documented attack that 
can be further studied and researched.  Part of this research goal is to take the first steps 
into finding ways of detecting and preventing such types of attacks on data caching 
networks.   
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3.2.5 Research Rigor 
 
The research rigor guideline states that the artifact should be constructed and evaluated 
through the application of rigorous methods [Hevner04].  The DoS attack created in this 
thesis was based on prior research methods developed and evaluated to infer military 
traffic.  The method involved finding a unique way to use a data cache to infer information 
about cache usage.  Using that research, combined with research on security attacks on 
networks, the DoS attack on data caching networks method was developed.  
 
3.2.6 Design as a Search Process 
 
The design as a search process guideline states that the artifact should be the result of a 
search process that is set to find the best solution to the problem [Hevner04].  The DoS 
attack on data caching networks method was developed with current research articles that 
were found in published articles and papers.  The simulated attack was developed using 
existing technologies and network architectures in place in research and production 
environments today. 
 
3.2.7 Communication of Research 
 
The objective of the communication guideline is to present the solution to both a 
technology-oriented as well as a management-oriented audience [Hevner04].  The 
technical implementation details is described in Chapter 4 and working code samples are 
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provided in Appendix A.  The thesis was presented to the public community of the 
University of North Florida in the form of a written document and a final defense. 
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Chapter 4 
PROPOSED ATTACK THEORY AND METHODS 
 
4.1 Objective and Scope 
 
The objective of this thesis is to design a new method and implementation for a DoS attack 
on data caching networks.  The new targeted attack method is described in detail in section 
4.2, followed by a description of the Java implementation of the attack.  The DoS attack is 
designed to be an internal attack.  The attack can be started and run using a malicious node 
or a set of malicious nodes within a data caching network.  The attack is not designed to 
spread or replicate from node to node, but the impact of the attack increases as the number 
of malicious nodes increases, as seen in most DoS attacks.  The impact of the attack could 
also increase as the distance in hops between the requester and the content custodian 
increases.  The attack is also designed to run for an infinite amount of time or until the 
attacker chooses to stop the attack.  While the attack is running, network performance is 
expected to be adversely affected and should not improve until the attack stops.   
 
This DoS attack can be used on any data caching network.  This includes networks that 
have any node that implements data caching.  One example of a data caching node could 
be a web server that hosts or caches video content.  The attack would cause the cache to 
become filled with unpopular content that was not previously in the cache.  This would 
cause requests for valid and popular content to be affected by the attack and thus take more 
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hops to complete.  Another example would be any network that has data caching on nodes 
along the path to the content custodian.  This type of network would cache content on nodes 
as requests pass through the node.  Any piece of content that is not in the node’s cache, 
will be added to the cache so if a similar request is received it will respond with the content 
in its cache.  This type of network can be seen in a hybrid mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) 
or ICNs as described in Chapter 2.   
 
The scope of this DoS attack is limited to looking at the attack and its risk impact on data 
caching networks.  The security of the network activity over the wire is not discussed in 
this thesis.  The process of obtaining control of the malicious node is also outside of the 
scope of this thesis.  The DoS method described in section 4.2 assumes that the node has 
been compromised or that a malicious user is now in control of the node.  Security attacks 
that attempt to alter the state of the content in the cache or vulnerabilities in the technologies 
used for content caching are also not discussed in this thesis. 
 
4.2 Proposed Attack Method 
 
Figure 3 shows a diagram of normal activity on a data caching network.  Figure 4 shows a 
diagram of the DoS attack in a data caching network that uses content caching at each node.  
The following section provides a detailed description of the proposed attack method used 
for the targeted DoS attack on data caching networks.  As stated in step 1, it is assumed 
that a malicious node has been compromised, yet undetected, and is used as the attack 
vector. 
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Figure 3: Normal Data Caching Network 
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Figure 4: DoS Attack on Data Caching Network 
 
4.2.1 DoS Attack Method 
 
1. We assume that the malicious node on the network is compromised through an out 
of scope vulnerability or method that occurred in an undetected way.  It is also 
assumed that this malicious node is known as non-malicious by other nodes on the 
network. 
2. The malicious node then begins a search of all content on content custodians in the 
network.  The malicious node creates a list of content ordered by the last access 
time stamp or by searching and getting all content on the custodian from a list of 
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keywords.  Keywords are used to find content that is older, archived, or uncommon 
(eg. archived, old, 1/1/1999).  The keyword list is then used to choose the most 
unpopular content from the list obtained.  The top results from this list are then 
marked to be used for the attack.  The attacking node can also get this list of 
unpopular content by polling the content that it routes.  Keeping a list of all the 
content that is routed through the node gives the node a popularity distribution of 
content that it can use to identify the least popular content.  This list of unpopular 
content is used to carry out the attack.   
3. An estimate of the cache size used on the network is created.  The research 
algorithm proposed by Dehghan, Goeckel, He, and Towsley’s paper on “Inferring 
Military Activity in Hybrid Networks through Cache Behavior” is used to 
continuously get a better estimate of the cache size, which is seen in Figure 5 
[Dehghan13].  If the attacker is knowledgeable about the targeted network in 
advance through security analysis, then the effects and speed of the attack are 
increased.  It is also an option to skip this step since it can be a safe assumption that 
most nodes have the same cache size on a given ICN. 
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Figure 5: Cache Size Estimation Algorithm from Dehghan et al. 
 
4. (Optional Smart Attack) An estimate of the characteristic time (T*) is then created. 
The research algorithm proposed by Dehghan et al. is shown in Figure 6, which is 
based on a binary search [Dehghan13].  A slight variation of the algorithm is 
proposed below which starts by waiting a larger amount of time, then reducing the 
guess until an acceptable value is found.  The goal of the variation in the algorithm 
is to develop an easier and faster implementation of the algorithm.  The process is 
described below. 
a. The first stage of the characteristic time calculation is to send a request for 
a piece of unpopular content then compare the number of hops to the 
custodian to the number of hops the request actually took.  The attacker is 
looking to see if the requested file was served by the content custodian or 
by a node in the route that has the content cached, thus resulting in a cache 
hit.  It is important that the request is made for a content item that is not 
requested by other users or one that is seen as very unpopular.  If the content 
requested is popular, then the newly proposed algorithm is altered and the 
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results will not be accurate. For this step, the attacker chooses the least 
popular file from the unpopular files list. 
 
 
Figure 6: Characteristic Time Estimation Algorithm from Dehghan et al. 
 
b. The first stage of the characteristic time calculation is to send a request for 
a piece of unpopular content then compare the number of hops to the 
custodian to the number of hops the request actually took.  The attacker is 
looking to see if the requested file was served by the content custodian or 
by a node in the route that has the content cached, thus resulting in a cache 
hit.  It is important that the request is made for a content item that is not 
requested by other users or one that is seen as very unpopular.  If the content 
requested is popular, then the newly proposed algorithm is altered and the 
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results will not be accurate. For this step, the attacker chooses the least 
popular file from the unpopular files list. 
c. Wait T* or the characteristic time guess, and repeat the request.  The first 
iteration of the newly proposed algorithm should use a larger T* initial 
guess.  Compare the number of hops taken in the request to the number of 
hops to the custodian.  
d. If the second request was served by the custodian, then the attacker knows 
the content was purged from all caches in the path.  Otherwise the content 
is still cached at a node in the path. 
i. If the request was served by the custodian, then the guess of T* is 
too big and a lower value should be tested. Now, set the 
characteristic time guess to T*/2.  Repeat step 4a with the new 
smaller T* guess.   
ii. If the request was not served by the custodian and served from a 
node’s cache, then the guess of T* is a good value and can be used 
as a best guess of the characteristic time. Once this step is reached, 
the characteristic time calculation is complete and the attack can be 
started. 
5. Perform the Attack 
a. If the smart attack is used, the DoS attack starts once a good value for 
characteristic time is found.  If the smart attack is not used, then the attacker 
sends requests for unpopular content from the list acquired in step 2.  The 
attacker should only send requests for any content according to the rate 
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observed in normal activity or just above the normal rate.  The attacker 
request rate was defined as the number of requests for unpopular content 
(attack requests) that the attacker node completed after a normal request.  
This thesis used attacker request rates of 1, 2, and 4.  These three values 
were arbitrarily chosen as a good distribution of attacker request rates to 
show an impact, but to also prevent detection.  Increasing the attacker 
request rate above 4 could be too much traffic to send in succession and 
could lead to higher chances of detection.  
b. A single number increment is placed on each piece of unpopular content 
that is requested. For every normal request, any unpopular files that have 
been sent are incremented by one.  If the smart attack is being used, the 
attacker can only choose unpopular files that have a number increment value 
less than the characteristic time (T*).  The attacker waits at least the 
characteristic time (T*) between requests for unpopular files.  This ensures 
the requested unpopular content leaves the cache of all nodes in the route 
path.  It also ensures randomly requested content to help prevent detection. 
If the smart attack is not being used, then the attacker node picks a random 
unpopular file from its unpopular file list. 
c. The attack continues sending requests for unpopular content until the 
attacker wants to stop the attack.   
 
The concept of characteristic time, in theory, allows for the attack to better affect every 
node in the path between the requester and the content custodian.  If the first node in the 
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path keeps a cached copy of the content, then requests for the same piece of content before 
the characteristic time would just return from that first node’s cache.  This is the main 
reason the concept of characteristic time is so important to this attack.  Waiting a minimum 
of at least the characteristic time between repeat requests allows for the attacker to request 
the same piece of content in a looping fashion. 
 
4.3 Proposed Attack Implementation 
 
In this section, the technology used during development and details on the programming 
implementation are discussed and defined.  A defined description of the technology used 
and the implementation details will be needed to fully understand the proposed new attack 
implementation.   
 
4.3.1 Technology 
 
There are many different technologies that can be used to implement this DoS attack.  Java 
was chosen as the language to develop an implementation of this new attack and also used 
to create the data caching network simulator.  Java presented data types that made using 
three different types of caching strategies easy to implement and code.  Java also supported 
creation of a graph object with weighted edges.  The Java Platform, Standard Edition (Java 
SE) Java Development Kit (JDK) version 8u25 was used, which was the latest version at 
the time of the development period. 
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IntelliJ IDEA community edition was chosen as the Java integrated development 
environment (IDE). IntelliJ also offers an enterprise edition of the IDE at a cost, but the 
free community edition was used for this thesis.  The latest version of Java JDK was 
supported in the community edition.  IntelliJ IDEA offered an environment for easy and 
fast Java development, compiling, and execution. GIT was used as the revision or source 
control system.  IntelliJ IDEA offered free integration with GIT which made source control 
very simple.  The latest version of GIT release code, version 2.2.1, was used at the time of 
development. 
 
The development was done in a Microsoft Windows environment.  All executables for 
IntelliJ, Java, and GIT were all run and tested on Windows 7 and Windows 8.  Development 
of the source code was completed with IntelliJ and completed in weekly sprints.  For 
testing, the simulator was run on the following computers described in Table 1. 
 
Specifications Machine 1 Machine 2 
Operating System Windows 7 x64 Windows 8 x64 
CPU 
AMD Phenom II X4 940 (3 
GHz) 
Intel Core i7 870 (2.93 GHz) 
Memory 8 GB 8 GB 
Hard Drive 256 GB 256 GB 
Hard Drive Type SSD SSD 
Table 1: Development Machine Information 
 
 
 
  
- 34 - 
4.3.2 Java ICN Simulator & Attack Implementation 
 
Java was used as the platform to build an initial implementation of this proposed DoS attack 
on data caching networks.  Java is an object oriented programming language, and many 
objects were used to create a network simulation with nodes and edges for evaluation.  
Basic classes were created including a node class, an attacker node class (extension of 
node), an edge class, a content class, and a graph class (collection of nodes and edges). 
 
To create the network in Java, first a new graph was created.  In the create graph method, 
nodes, edges, and content were created according to the input variables.  As an example, a 
square graph was created that contained 25 nodes.  Since it was a square graph, nodes were 
placed in a matrix pattern with 5 nodes wide and 5 nodes high.  Edges were then created to 
connect every node to its neighbors (matrix) to the top, bottom, left, or right of the node.  
Diagonal edges were not created in the square graph matrix. Edges were created with a 
weight to supported weighted graphs and were created as directional edges.  In order to 
connect node 1 to node 2 bi-directionally, an edge would need to be created from node 1 
to node 2 and then also created from node 2 to node 1. 
 
After creating all the nodes and edges on the graph, content custodians were chosen at 
random and assigned content using an equal distribution.  In the 25 node matrix, 20% or 5 
nodes were chosen at random locations and assigned as custodians.  Changing the value of 
the number of custodians will change the results, but 20% was arbitrarily chosen as a 
constant.  The node then stored the content locally on the node and thus was the custodian.  
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After all custodians were created, all other nodes on the network were updated to store the 
location of each piece of content.  Each node stored a hash table of the content custodians 
which included a reference to the content object and a corresponding reference to the node 
object where it could be found. 
 
All content on the network was then assigned a popularity value according to the Zipfian 
distribution.  The Zipfian distribution assigned each content object a popularity value based 
on the value of alpha given as an argument.  Two primary alpha values were tested during 
the evaluation phase, 0.65, and 0.85.  These values were chosen as they were common 
values tested when implementing the Zipfian distribution.  Changing the value of the 
Zipfian alpha will change the results, but 20% was arbitrarily chosen as a constant.  The 
alpha would be used to distribute the values of the content popularity, which would assign 
them in ascending order.  To appropriately distribute content randomly among the 
custodians, the values were shuffled and then assigned to each content object.  After this 
was completed, the graph was fully created and ready to send and receive requests. 
 
For each cache type and cache size, a series of tests were performed on the simulated 
network.  The search class was used to perform all the work of processing the requests.  
The value of 100,000 was used as a constant in all evaluation testing for the number of 
request to perform for each test.  The search class would create packet objects which would 
help the nodes route the request and store data about the request.  The packet would start 
at the source node and perform Dijkstra’s algorithm to determine the shortest path to the 
custodian that held the requested content item. That custodian would then become the 
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destination node and a path array was established.  The packet would use the node’s 
methods of send and receive data to route the request and check each nodes cache at every 
hop to see if the content could be served from the node’s cache.  If the content was found 
in the cache of a node in the path, then the request was served from that node and statistics 
of the completed request were stored in the packet class.  If the content was not found in 
the cache of a node in the path, then that node would store that content in its own cache 
according to the caching policy being used on that network.  The requested content object 
was selected according to the probability distribution of the content.  More popular content 
was requested more frequently than less popular content.  The source node, or requester, 
was selected at random for all nodes that were not custodians.  
 
To ensure all nodes in the network had appropriate time to populate caches with content, 
also known as cache warming, no data were saved for the first 70% of the total test. Thus 
if the test called for 100 requests, only the statistics of the last 30 requests would be kept 
to allow for cache warming. After collecting the data from all packets, the data were stored 
in a packet tracer class to keep a history of all of the tests and statistics.  This process was 
repeated until all cache types and cache sizes were fully tested according to the constant 
variables defined.   
 
To ensure that a correct and valid evaluation was performed, a pattern was established 
during the first run of every unique cache type and cache size.  The pattern consisted of the 
exact source, destination, and content of each request or packet. This method helped create 
a constant variable for when attacker node objects were added to the network.  Having a 
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pattern allowed for the same tests and order of requests to be performed after adding 
attackers to the network.  This ensured that the dependent variable, average number of 
hops, would be comparing the same sets of data while only changing the number of attacker 
node objects.  
 
After testing a network with no attacker nodes, the same network structure was used.  
Random nodes were selected to add attackers to the network.  The nodes were converted 
to an attacker node object that extends the node class. This allowed for the node methods 
to be overwritten to perform the attack.  Once all attacker node objects were added to the 
network, Dijkstra’s algorithm had to be recomputed on all nodes so every node would 
correctly find the shortest path to content.   This ensured that all regular node objects would 
send requests for content without knowing the attacker node was malicious.   
 
The attacker node object had three primary methods that made it different than a normal 
node: polling for content to determine popularity, sending the attack, and determining a 
good value for characteristic time.  The warm up period was used by an attacker node to 
poll all content that it served.  After polling for some time, the node would have a new 
popularity distribution of content based on what it had served on the network.  This is one 
way the attacker node could know that sending a request for a given content item was 
indeed unpopular.  The attack method was used when the attacker node was the source 
node of a request packet.  The attacker would send its request for the content according to 
the pattern established.  After that request was complete, the attacker node would then send 
X number of request packets for unpopular content.  The value of X was kept as a constant 
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in the evaluation and was defined as the Attacker Request Rate.  In order to prevent 
detection, small request rates were tested during the evaluation phase including the values 
of 1, 2 and 4.  This meant that each time an attacker node was a source node in a packet, 
an additional 1, 2, or 4 packets would be created and sent over the network.  By requesting 
unpopular content, popular content would be purged from the active cache stores of the 
node objects in the path to the unpopular file’s custodian.   
 
An improved attack method was also found and tested during the evaluation.  This 
improvement was named the smart attack, which used the concept of Characteristic Time 
(T*) as described in section 4.2.  When this attack was used, the node needed to calculate 
the value of Characteristic Time.  The GuessCharacteristicTime method chose the most 
unpopular file, requested that file, waited a large amount of time (a multiple of the cache 
size value), re-requested the same file and saw if the custodian served the request.  If the 
request was filled by the custodian, a smaller value was chosen as the guess and the process 
would repeat.  This continued until the request was served by a node in the path (not the 
custodian), thus resulting in a cache hit. This final value was saved on the attacker node as 
the final characteristic time guess and used when determining which unpopular file to 
request during the attack.  The attack method did not change, with the exception of only 
requesting an unpopular file that had not been requested in at least the characteristic time.  
The attacker node kept a hash table to store and update the unpopular file list during the 
attack.   
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All test results were stored and compared in a graph after all test runs were completed.  An 
example of a completed test can be seen in Figure 7 below. 
 
 
Figure 7: Java Simulator Test Results Example 
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Chapter 5 
EVALUATION 
 
5.1 Evaluation Objectives 
 
The cache pollution attack described in the paper by Conti et al. [Conti13] was shown to 
produce positive attack results in a small network graph. This research was started to 
develop a specific implementation of the proposed cache pollution DoS attack.  The 
simulator developed in Java was used to evaluate the implementation of the attack across 
multiple cache replacement policies (LRU, FIFO, Random), multiple cache sizes, and most 
importantly on multiple network sizes.  The simulator was used to evaluate the average 
number of hops for each unique cache type and cache size on each of the three network 
scenarios.  After a pattern was established on the first run of each unique cache type and 
cache size graph, attackers would be added to the network and the test would be run again 
with attackers.  After running the complete test with and without attackers, the two values 
of average number of hops could be compared to calculate the percentage increase. 
 
All other variables were created as constants including the number of tests run and the 
numbers of requests performed per test. The pattern established on the first test also 
remained the same as other tests were run with and without attackers.  The location of the 
custodians and the content found on the custodians also remained unchanged for each test 
after the pattern was established.  The number of unpopular files used in the attack was a 
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variable that was chosen after running tests with many different values.  Since results were 
different depending on the number of unpopular files each attacker used, that number 
needed to remain constant.  Statistics were used to determine which value was chosen as 
this variable.  Table 2 below shows the results of those tests, in which different percentages 
of the currently tested cache size were used to determine the number of unpopular files.   
 
Number of Unpopular files: Percent 
Cache Size (%) 
Average Percent 
Increase (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
80% 8.113225856 3.030205472 
100% 10.11736493 2.80922496 
120% 11.18972473 3.46343106 
150% 8.792727194 2.491202425 
200% 11.05813752 6.648555748 
Table 2: Number of Unpopular Files Test 
 
After evaluating the results of this test, 120% of the current cache size was chosen as the 
value to use in all tests.  120% of the current cache size means that the number of unpopular 
files used by each attacker changes as the cache size changes.  For example, if the cache 
size being tested is 10, the number of unpopular files each attacker uses is set to 12 (120% 
of 10).  Unpopular content items are those that have the lowest popularity value based on 
the Zipfian distribution that was established during the network graph creation.  When a 
value of 12 was used as the number of unpopular items, the attacker would select the 12 
content items with the lowest popularity value.  This list could also be established by 
polling the network or by having the list of the entire content universe, but this was not 
how it was implemented in this simulator.  
 
- 42 - 
When evaluating the average hops taken to complete the requests in each test, only the 
requests that were served by a cache hit when the pattern was established were taken into 
consideration.  This was done to ensure the results were truly evaluating the effectiveness 
of the attack on the data caches.  If a request was served by the content custodian during 
the pattern simulation run, any attack on the data cache could not lengthen the hops taken 
to retrieve that piece of content.  For example, if a node requested content “A” that was 
served by the custodian in say 7 hops, then that is the worst case scenario for the 
performance of that specific request.  In this example, the content was served in a maximum 
of 7 hops due to the size of the network and how many nodes were between requesting 
node and the custodian node.  The maximum number of hops will vary depending on the 
number of hops between a requester and a custodian.  The data caching on the network for 
that request didn’t serve the request, and thus any attack on the data caching would be 
useless.  For this reason, during the first run of a given test when the pattern is established, 
only the requests that are requested by a normal node (not an attacker) and served by a data 
cache (cache hit) are taken into consideration in the average number of hops in all tests.  
Any requests that are served by the custodian during the pattern simulation run are not 
included in the average hops calculation. 
 
Another objective of this research was to develop a smarter cache pollution attack based 
on the previous research on characteristic time and caching.  A smart attack was developed 
as described in Chapter 4, and was also evaluated against the normal cache pollution attack.  
To evaluate the smart attack, tests were run without the smart attack and then run with the 
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same graph structure with the smart attack.  This ensured that the two different attacks were 
evaluated in a consistent manner.   
 
5.1.1 Evaluation Limitations 
 
While evaluating the large scale networks, memory limitations were found.  All 
development and testing was completed on personal hardware that had at most 8GB of 
RAM.  During the testing of the 25 and 100 node square graphs, all cache types, cache 
sizes, and number of attackers could be tested with a large loop function.  The simulator 
allowed for looping through each specific test and the 100 node graph would use around 
4-5GB of RAM after completing all tests.  When testing the large scale Gnutella networks, 
tests needed to be looped one cache size at a time.  Just looping with one cache type, one 
cache size, and one size of attackers would exceed 6-8GB of RAM.  For this reason, batch 
scripts were created to loop through each specific test so all variable combinations could 
be tested.  The amount of time taken to loop through this simulation should also be taken 
into consideration.  When looping with the 6301 node Gnutella network with one cache 
type and one cache size, the test would take 40-60 minutes to complete using a machine 
with an Intel i7 quad core processor and DDR3 RAM.  Running this same test on an AMD 
Phenom II quad core processor with DDR3 RAM took 90-120 minutes.  This shows the 
simulator is very processor and memory intensive and hardware chosen to run testing 
should be considered carefully.  
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5.2 Experiment Scenarios 
 
In order to fully evaluate the scale of the proposed DoS attack, three different scenarios 
were setup.  The first experiment was a simple line graph setup with 5 nodes, including 
one requester, one custodian, and one attacker.  The second scenario developed was a 
square graph that can also be seen as a matrix.  The square graph had up to 100 nodes on 
the network, including 20 custodians (20%), and remaining nodes were requesters.  
Attackers were added to the graph and testing up to 16 attacker nodes (16%).  The third 
scenario developed was the Gnutella peer-to-peer dataset from the Stanford SNAP database 
[Leskovec14].  Two different real world graphs were imported, including a 6301 node 
graph and an 8846 node graph.  Each Gnutella graph included 5% custodians, and the 
remaining nodes were requesters.  Up to 16% attackers were also added and tested on both 
of these networks. 
 
5.2.1 Scenario 1: Line Graph 
 
This evaluation scenario can be seen as the proof of concept for the targeted DoS attack on 
data caching networks.  In this scenario, 5 nodes were created including one requester and 
one custodian.  The requester was the first node in the line graph and the custodian was the 
last node in the graph when visualizing the graph from left to right.  The other 3 nodes 
connected the requester to the custodian.  Edges were set so the furthest left node would 
connect to the neighbor node to its right, and this would continue to the custodian.  Only 
two content items were available on the custodian, one being the popular item and one 
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being the unpopular item.  Each node was given a cache size of 1, and the requester always 
requested the popular file.  An attacker node was added to the graph and its edge was 
connected to the second node in the graph, or the only node that the requester was 
connected to.  This attacker node always requested the unpopular file and the requester 
always requested the popular file.  Both nodes requested at the same rate, but that does not 
mean that the requests alternated as that would be the worst case scenario.  Figure 8 shows 
a visual representation of this evaluation scenario.  
 
 
Figure 8: Line Graph 
 
5.2.2 Scenario 2: Square Graph 
 
This evaluation scenario was set up to test the effectiveness of the DoS attack on a small 
network topology.  A simple matrix or square graph was chosen to implement this 
evaluation scenario.  The square graph was tested with 25 and 100 total nodes on the 
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network, which tested a 5x5 graph and a 10x10 graph respectively.  In this scenario, 20% 
of the total number of nodes were selected at random as the custodians and the rest of the 
nodes were selected as requesters.  A total of 1000 content items were distributed equally 
to these custodians and popularity was randomized amongst all content as described in the 
implementation section in Chapter 4.  Each node was connected to its neighbor to the top, 
bottom, left, or right of the node.  If a node existed at one of those locations, an edge was 
created.  This established a matrix square graph network that could be visualized as a grid 
as seen in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Square Graph 
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The following method was applied on scenario 2 and scenario 3 as mentioned earlier in 
Chapter 4.  The first run of every test always started with 0 attackers, and requesters were 
selected at random.  The node selected then requested content based on the Zipfian 
popularity distribution.  Using a Zipfian popularity distribution and a constant alpha (values 
tested included: 0.65, 0.85) the requests were created and a pattern was established.  When 
attackers were added to the graph, the same pattern was used as a constant variable.  The 
pattern consisted of the source node, the destination node, and the content being searched 
for.  The same pattern that was established with 0 attackers was used for every test after 
the first run to ensure correct statistics were being collected.  Attackers were added to the 
graph, and when the pattern ran into an attacker node, the attacker would send the request 
for the popular content item and then send X number of attack requests (unpopular content) 
based on the constant variable for the attacker request rate.  
 
5.2.3 Scenario 3: Real World (Gnutella) Graph 
 
This evaluation scenario was set up to test the effectiveness of the DoS attack on a real 
world peer-to-peer network topology.  The Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection was 
used to test two real world Gnutella peer-to-peer networks [Leskovec14].  From the dataset, 
a 6,301 node graph with 20,777 directed edges and an 8,846 node graph with 31,839 
directed edges were chosen as test networks for this evaluation scenario.  With this many 
nodes, 5% of the total number of nodes were selected at random as the custodians and the 
rest of the nodes were selected as requesters.  A total of 2,000 content items were 
distributed equally to these custodians and popularity was randomized amongst all content 
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as described in the implementation section in Chapter 4.  Each dataset from the SNAP 
dataset included a list of all edges in each network.  This list of edges was imported from 
the downloaded file which created the unique network graph based on the Gnutella 
structure.   
 
5.3 Evaluation Results 
 
This research aims to analyze the impact of a DoS attack on data caching networks.  Two 
independent sets of simulations (without attackers and with attackers) were run on the same 
graph to produce results shown in the dependent variable of average number of hops.  As 
stated earlier, the average number of hops was only considered for normal requester nodes 
that returned a cache hit during the establishment of the pattern.  This ensured that only the 
average number of hops resulting from a result of the attack were shown in the results.   
 
For each scenario, the simulator measured the average number of hops for requests that 
when ran without attackers returned cache hits.  Attackers were added to the graph using 
2%, 4%, 8%, and 16% of the current graph size as attackers.  Data collected on the line 
graph and the 25 node square graph were unable to perform tests for each of these 
percentages as they were too small in size.  The line graph network results were collected 
for a proof of concept to show that the attack was valid.  The 25 node square graph results 
show 4%, 8%, 16%, and 32% attackers since the minimum number of attackers on this 
small of a graph was 1 attacker or 4%.  Data collected in each simulation are independent 
as results collected for one test do not interfere with results collected in another test.   
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5.3.1 Scenario 1 – Line Graph Results  
 
In the line graph scenario, the requests from the normal node and the attacker node occurred 
at the same rate.  This scenario aimed to show that the attack was possible and that a simple 
proof of concept line graph would show that the attack was valid.  Each of the cache types 
of LRU, FIFO, and Random were tested in this scenario and both 1 and 2 attackers were 
also tested.  Figure 10 shows that the average number of hops increased as the number of 
attackers on the graph increased from 1 to 2.  Figure 11 shows that the percent increase of 
109% for the average number of hops for normal requesters is very large when an attacker 
is on the network.  As seen in Figure 10 and Figure 11, when the cache size is 0 all requests 
are served from the custodian which is 4 hops from the requester in this simulation.  Also, 
when there is no attacker on the network and the cache size is 1, the neighbor to the 
requester always has the popular file in its cache and thus always returns the content in the 
first hop after the warm up period.   
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Figure 10: Line Graph Network Average Number of Hops 
 
 
Figure 11: Line Graph Network Percent Increase 
 
Table 3 shows that the attack was very effective during this line graph network scenario 
across all cache types.  The results also show that as the number of attackers increased, the 
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average number of hops increased accordingly.  This attack was also very effective due to 
the fact that only two pieces of content existed on the network.  By defining that one content 
item was popular and the other was unpopular, the results showed that with limited number 
of content items on the network, the attack would be very effective.  Three different cache 
replacement policies were tested in the line graph, and the results of this scenario did not 
show a difference in using one policy over another.   
 
Cache Type Mean: 1 
Attacker 
Std. Deviation: 
1 Attacker 
Mean: 2 
Attackers 
Std. Deviation: 
2 Attackers 
LRU 108.8 0 129.2 0 
FIFO 111.2 0 116.4 0 
Random 112 0 120.8 0 
Grand Total 110.6666 1.3597 122.1333 5.3099 
Table 3: Line Graph Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
5.3.2 Scenario 2 – Square Graph Results 
 
In the square graph scenario, a 25 node network and a 100 node network was tested which 
created a 5x5 and a 10x10 matrix network respectively.  Each network was created using 
the same method, using the independent variables of 20% custodians, 10 tests, and 100,000 
requests per test.  The 25 node network was tested with 1 attacker (4%), 2 attackers (8%), 
4 attackers (16%), and 8 attackers (32%).  The 100 node network was tested with 2 
attackers (2%), 4 attackers (4%), 8 attackers (8%), and 16 attackers (16%).  Since the 25 
node network was too small to test with 2% attackers, the best comparisons can be made 
using 4%, 8%, and 16% attackers.  Each graph was also tested with two values for the 
Zipfian alpha (0.65 & 0.85) which changed the distribution of the content popularity. 
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Values of 1, 2, and 4 were used as the attacker request rate which defined how many 
unpopular files the attacker node would request for each attack request.  All plotted charts 
can be found in Appendix B.  Figure 12 shows an example of the percent increase found 
in the 25 node network using LRU caching strategy and an attacker request rate of 1. Figure 
13 shows the percentage increase found in the 100 node network using LRU caching 
strategy and an attacker request rate of 1.  As seen in the charts, the overall percentage 
increase was 2%-4% smaller as the size of the graph grew from 25 to 100 nodes.  The 
results also show that the evaluation was performed with minimal error using LRU and 
FIFO cache replacement policies.  The results in Appendix B show that using a random 
cache replacement policy increased the value of the error bars due to the randomness of the 
cache replacement policy.   
 
 
Figure 12: Square Graph - 25 Nodes, using LRU, and Attacker Request Rate of 1 
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Figure 13: Square Graph - 100 Nodes, using LRU, and Attacker Request Rate of 1 
 
The mean of all the percent increases collected was also calculated for each unique cache 
type, cache size, Zipfian alpha, and attacker request rate.  The standard deviation of the 
entire population was also calculated for each of these unique combinations.  All collected 
statistics can be found in Appendix B.  Table 4 shows a combination of all stats collected 
on the 25 node square graph for 4%, 8%, 16%, and 32% attackers.  Table 5 shows a 
combination of all stats collected on the 100 node square graph for 4%, 8%, 16%, and 32% 
attackers.  All values in both tables are displayed as percentage increases calculated by the 
simulator using various numbers of attackers.  Each table shows the results collected for 
the mean and standard deviation of LRU, FIFO, and random cache replacement policies 
using attacker request rates of 1, 2, and 4.  The total rows shown at the end of each attacker 
request rate evaluated display the mean and the standard deviation of all the cache 
- 54 - 
replacement polices at the given attacker request rate.  For example, the 1 total row and 
mean 4% attackers column shows the results of the average percentage increase across 
LRU, FIFO, and random cache replacement policies using an attacker request rate of 1 and 
4% attackers.  This value shows a good average that can be expected from the attack when 
using an attacker request rate of 1 and 4 attackers, regardless of what cache replacement 
policy is used.  The grand total row is added to show the mean percentage increase of each 
evaluated number of attackers.  The average percentage increase across all evaluated 
attacker request rates showed a decrease as the size of the network increased, which can be 
seen in the grand total row. 
 
- 55 - 
Rate 
Cache 
Type 
Mean: 
4% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 4% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
8% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 8% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
16% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 16% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
32% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 32% 
Attackers 
1 LRU 2.8021 0.8014 5.4001 1.3287 9.4280 1.8237 16.5540 2.1850 
 FIFO 4.2650 1.5070 6.7171 1.4512 11.6098 1.4974 17.5756 0.8910 
 Random 6.8465 2.2845 7.7570 2.5399 8.9012 2.2551 10.2906 2.2157 
1 Total  4.6379 2.3466 6.6247 2.0907 9.9797 2.2195 14.8067 3.7235 
2 LRU 4.6778 1.4546 7.9589 1.6079 13.5661 2.3762 21.9207 3.7898 
 FIFO 4.9995 0.9143 8.2810 1.2684 15.2432 1.5159 23.0598 0.5477 
 Random 4.6945 1.2789 6.3522 1.2567 8.0969 1.0437 11.8739 1.5567 
2 Total  4.7906 1.2454 7.5307 1.6236 12.3021 3.5102 18.9515 5.5639 
4 LRU 6.2265 1.6745 10.4373 1.0293 16.9176 2.3334 25.5914 1.8264 
 FIFO 5.5726 2.1682 9.8396 2.8519 16.9229 2.2278 26.6797 2.1167 
 Random 6.7405 1.7346 6.1768 2.5650 8.4563 3.0551 11.2954 2.7274 
4 Total  6.1799 1.9321 8.8179 2.9672 14.0989 4.7434 21.1888 7.3636 
Grand 
Total 
 5.2028 2.0194 7.6578 2.4658 12.1269 4.0116 18.3157 6.3250 
Table 4: Square Graph 25 Node (Zipfian=0.65): Percentage Increase Statistics 
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Rate 
Cache 
Type 
Mean: 
2% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 2% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
4% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 4% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
8% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 8% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
16% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 16% 
Attackers 
1 LRU 1.3405 0.3363 2.3684 0.3245 4.3202 0.6322 7.7166 1.0344 
 FIFO 1.8617 0.3391 3.0553 0.5060 5.3064 0.5942 8.6093 1.0126 
 Random 5.0120 2.1569 5.4562 2.2420 5.9421 2.2029 7.1760 2.1798 
1 Total  2.7381 2.0634 3.6266 1.8837 5.1896 1.5211 7.8340 1.6222 
2 LRU 1.9977 0.3909 3.6754 0.6713 6.3476 1.0592 10.2613 1.6947 
 FIFO 1.8622 0.2527 3.3473 0.5085 6.0782 0.5963 9.7940 1.5589 
 Random 5.2901 2.5830 6.0852 2.6980 7.0544 2.6648 9.0873 2.6381 
2 Total  3.0500 2.1928 4.3693 2.0379 6.4934 1.7404 9.7142 2.0785 
4 LRU 3.0606 0.6066 5.4929 0.8816 8.8349 0.5561 13.7887 0.9263 
 FIFO 3.0641 0.7003 5.1621 0.6631 9.2712 0.4866 14.5649 0.9853 
 Random 5.0844 1.7007 6.0817 1.9419 7.4762 1.8621 9.3821 1.7938 
4 Total  3.7364 1.4693 5.5789 1.3443 8.5274 1.3864 12.5786 2.6252 
Grand 
Total 
 3.1748 1.9787 4.5249 1.9537 6.7368 2.0756 10.0422 2.9017 
Table 5: Square Graph 100 Node (Zipfian=0.65): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
5.3.3 Scenario 3 – Gnutella Graph Results 
 
In the Gnutella graph scenario, a 6301 node network and an 8846 node network were tested.  
The graphs were imported from the Stanford SNAP dataset from the Internet peer-to-peer 
graphs [Leskovec14].  Each network was created using the same method, using the 
independent variables of 5% custodians, 10 tests, and 100,000 requests per test.  Each 
network was tested with 2% attackers (126 & 176 nodes), 4% attackers (252 & 353 nodes), 
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8% attackers (504 & 707 nodes), and 16% attackers (1008 & 1415 nodes).  Each graph was 
also tested with two values for the Zipfian alpha (0.65 & 0.85) which changed the 
distribution of the content popularity. Values of 1, 2, and 4 were used as the attacker request 
rate which defined how many unpopular files the attacker node would request for each 
attack request.  All plotted charts can be found in Appendix B, and Figure 14 shows an 
example of the percent increase found in the 6301 node network using LRU caching 
strategy and an attacker request rate of 1. Figure 15 shows the percentage increase found 
in the 8846 node network using LRU caching strategy and an attacker request rate of 1.  
The results of the Gnutella scenario also show a small drop in percentage increase as the 
size of the graph grew from 6301 nodes to 8846 nodes.  The results also show that the 
evaluation was performed with minimal error using LRU and FIFO cache replacement 
policies.  The results in Appendix B show that using a random cache replacement policy 
increased the value of the error bars due to the randomness of the cache replacement policy.   
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Figure 14: Gnutella Graph - 6301 Nodes, using LRU, and Attacker Request Rate of 1 
 
 
Figure 15: Gnutella Graph - 8846 Nodes, using LRU, and Attacker Request Rate of 1 
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Statistics were generated from all tests run on the two different size Gnutella graphs.  When 
comparing the mean between the 6301 node graph and the 8846 node graph, a small 
decrease in the average percent increase can be seen.  All collected statistics can be found 
in Appendix B. Table 6 shows a combination of all stats collected on the 6301 node 
Gnutella graph for 2%, 4%, 8%, and 16% attackers.  Table 7 shows a combination of all 
stats collected on the 8846 node Gnutella graph for 2%, 4%, 8%, and 16% attackers.  The 
total rows shown at the end of each attacker request rate evaluated display the mean and 
the standard deviation of all the cache replacement polices at the given attacker request 
rate.  For example, the 1 total row and mean 4% attackers column shows the results of the 
average percentage increase across LRU, FIFO, and random cache replacement policies 
using an attacker request rate of 1 and 4% attackers.  This value shows a good average that 
can be expected from the attack when using an attacker request rate of 1 and 4 attackers, 
regardless of what cache replacement policy is used.  The grand total row is added to show 
the mean percentage increase of each evaluated number of attackers.  The average 
percentage increase across all evaluated attacker request rates showed a decrease as the 
size of the network increased, which can be seen in the grand total row. 
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Rate 
Cache 
Type 
Mean: 
2% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 2% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
4% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 4% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
8% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 8% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
16% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 16% 
Attackers 
1 LRU 0.6122 0.0709 1.0224 0.0515 1.8139 0.0952 3.0220 0.1516 
 FIFO 1.1236 0.0972 1.7955 0.1299 2.7140 0.1696 4.1017 0.2510 
 Random 0.8270 0.1139 1.1981 0.0688 1.7011 0.0354 2.3947 0.1116 
1 Total  0.8543 0.2305 1.3387 0.3429 2.0764 0.4674 3.1728 0.7279 
2 LRU 0.8594 0.0470 1.4177 0.0587 2.5109 0.0202 4.1999 0.1512 
 FIFO 1.4053 0.1464 2.2980 0.1358 3.4862 0.2925 5.0724 0.2670 
 Random 1.0516 0.0974 1.4507 0.0942 2.1109 0.0456 3.1348 0.1407 
2 Total  1.1054 0.2493 1.7221 0.4198 2.7027 0.6025 4.1357 0.8159 
4 LRU 1.1071 0.0698 2.0630 0.0467 3.4351 0.0580 5.3538 0.0681 
 FIFO 1.7784 0.1684 2.8220 0.2614 4.2863 0.2365 6.1141 0.2380 
 Random 1.2435 0.0855 1.7740 0.0985 2.5912 0.0823 3.8656 0.2549 
4 Total  1.3763 0.3122 2.2197 0.4713 3.4375 0.7077 5.1112 0.9561 
Grand 
Total 
 1.1120 0.3411 1.7602 0.5496 2.7389 0.8187 4.1399 1.1530 
Table 6: Gnutella Graph 6301 Node (Zipfian=0.65): Percentage Increase Statistics 
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Rate 
Cache 
Type 
Mean: 
2% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 2% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
4% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 4% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
8% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 8% 
Attackers 
Mean: 
16% 
Attackers 
Std. 
Deviation
: 16% 
Attackers 
1 LRU 0.4441 0.0575 0.8310 0.0572 1.4857 0.1225 2.4147 0.1155 
 FIFO 0.8939 0.0685 1.4670 0.1234 2.2687 0.1196 3.5280 0.2095 
 Random 0.7301 0.1098 1.0044 0.1551 1.4478 0.0629 2.1777 0.0742 
1 Total  0.6894 0.2031 1.1008 0.2937 1.7341 0.3928 2.7068 0.6062 
2 LRU 0.7130 0.0377 1.2734 0.0666 2.1661 0.1312 3.4845 0.1998 
 FIFO 1.1960 0.0858 1.9668 0.1548 3.0387 0.1828 4.6194 0.2129 
 Random 0.8487 0.0699 1.3241 0.0770 1.9098 0.0798 2.8567 0.1407 
2 Total  0.9193 0.2143 1.5214 0.3332 2.3715 0.5025 3.6535 0.7531 
4 LRU 0.9715 0.0785 1.6770 0.0781 2.8111 0.1438 4.5888 0.1307 
 FIFO 1.4867 0.1110 2.4278 0.0921 3.6657 0.2104 5.4114 0.2733 
 Random 1.0122 0.0696 1.5294 0.0583 2.3276 0.1183 3.4884 0.2909 
4 Total  1.1568 0.2500 1.8781 0.4009 2.9348 0.5766 4.4962 0.8243 
Grand 
Total 
 0.9218 0.2938 1.5001 0.4693 2.3468 0.6979 3.6189 1.0355 
Table 7: Gnutella Graph 8846 Node (Zipfian=0.65): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
After collecting all the results from all of the simulations, charts were created and are 
shown in Appendix B.  The main contributions of this research were accomplished by 
creating an extensible ICN simulator, creating and implementing a DoS attack on data 
caching networks, and testing the scalability of the attack implementation.  All charts 
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collected in the scalability testing showed a clear fall in the impact of the attack as the size 
of the network increased.   
 
After analyzing all of the results collected, a few trends were found.  The first trend that 
can be seen from the results is that the implemented cache pollution attack does not scale 
as Conti et al. discussed in their paper [Conti13].  As the size of the graph increased, the 
impact of the attack decreased.  This can be seen in the steady decrease in values for in 
average percentage increase.  This was seen clearly in the charts and shown to be true in 
the statistics collected for each set of graphs and shown in Tables 4-7 in the grand total 
row.  The largest percent increases were seen on the smaller square graphs, which were 
similar to the graphs shown in previous research [Conti13].  
 
One trend that was shown to remain true in the results was that as the number of attackers 
increased, the effect of the attack also increased.  This was seen in the increasing values of 
the percentage increase as the number of attackers increased for a given graph.  The results 
also showed a larger impact from the attack as the attacker request rate increased.  This 
was expected as most DoS attacks show larger effects as the number of attackers increase 
in theory. 
 
Another trend that was suggested by the results was that FIFO showed to be the consistently 
most affected caching strategy for the attack.  Comparing the percent increase to LRU 
showed larger percent increases as seen in the 25 node square graph with an attacker 
request rate of 1.  It was expected that LRU would be the most resilient caching strategy 
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for this data caching DoS attack since a main goal of LRU is to filter out unpopular content 
by prioritizing the most used content in the cache. 
 
5.5 Future Work 
 
As shown in Chapter 4, an initial version of the proposed smart attack was created and 
implemented in this research.  A software based content centric network simulator was also 
developed to evaluate the proposed implementation.  Initial results on the smaller graphs 
showed that this proposed improvement on the attack was inconsistent.  The theory of the 
proposed smart attack should prove to be an improvement on the initial attack.  One future 
improvement of this implementation of the DoS attack on data caching networks would be 
to improve the logic of the smart attack using the concept of characteristic time (T*).   
 
Extending this research to evaluate the attack using hardware testing instead of the software 
simulator would also qualify as an extension of this research.  This type of evaluation would 
require a dedicated lab of computers that each would represent a node or a collection of 
nodes.  Connecting each of the computers to an internal network and building a new test 
would create a physical ICN in which testing of the attack could be performed.  It would 
be recommended to ensure this network was disconnected from all other networks, 
including the Internet, to ensure the attack was limited to lab computers only.  
 
The ICN simulator was built using custom Java objects that can be reused for many 
different types of data collection.  Three optional variables that are not calculated or used 
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for extensive testing are edge delay, multiple values for weighted edges, and power 
consumption on nodes.  The edge delay could be collected by making some small source 
code changes to the variables collected.  The edge weight was set to a default value of 1 in 
the simulator, and thus made all edges un-weighted.  Power consumption is another 
variable that a node could be assigned if the node is mobile.  Performing analysis on new 
variables such as these would be a very good extension of this research.  
 
Another subject that could be used for future work on this research is to apply this attack 
and test it on host to host networks.  A node on a host to host network could turn into an 
attacker and then actively or passively poll web servers or other computers for content.  
This would allow the attacker to define a list of popular and unpopular content.  A web 
crawler could be used on a web server to search a website for old or archived data and add 
that content to the list of unpopular content.  Just sending out a large amount of requests 
for unpopular content would, in theory, fill up the web server’s cache with unpopular 
content and begin removing popular content from the cache.  This would have a similar 
effect on normal requests as they would no longer be able to retrieve content from the 
server’s cache and thus performance would be affected.  With enough attackers, it is 
possible that this attack could overload the server’s hardware resources or database queries 
and cause the service to shutdown preventing all users from accessing the server.
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research has provided an initial implementation of a DoS attack on data caching 
networks, or what is known as a cache pollution attack.  The implementation of the ICN 
simulator and attack was developed using Java.  The attack was evaluated for scalability 
by testing with 3 different types of graphs (line graph, square graph, Gnutella graph).  The 
attack showed consistent improvement in performance in terms of percentage increase in 
average number of hops on cache hits.  The results also showed that the attack does not 
scale as well as was initially thought in previous research.  As the size of the graph 
increased, the average percent increase in average hops decreased.  The greatest impact of 
the DoS attack was found on the line graph and on the 25 node square graph, which were 
the two smallest graphs in terms of number of nodes evaluated.  The findings of this 
research contribute to the overall security research field by providing a description of a 
new attack that can be further researched.   
 
We have identified three areas that can be considered for future research work.  The 
improvement of the proposed smart attack using the concept of characteristic time (T*) 
could improve the initial version of the attack.  Any logic that can be added to the attack 
should yield performance improvements on the attack algorithm and its effects.  Creating 
and testing the attack on a physical ICN in a lab environment would allow for evaluation 
of the attack on physical hardware.  This would be the next step in moving this type of 
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attack into a real world environment or test network.  Expanding the current 
implementation of the Java simulator to include new variables and metrics such as delay, 
edge weights, and battery life is another option for extending this research.  Evaluating the 
proposed DoS attack on host to host networks could be another area of future work on this 
research.  
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APPENDIX A 
Source Code Examples 
 
Git respository URL: https://github.com/gougej88/ICNDataCachingSimulator 
Line Graph repository: https://github.com/gougej88/LineChartThesis 
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Node Class Example 
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Edge Class Example 
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Graph Class Example 
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Content Class Example 
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Packet Class Example 
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AttackerNode Class Example 
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APPENDIX B 
Results Collected 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
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5x5 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
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5x5 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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5x5 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
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5x5 Square Graph (Zipfian=0.65): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
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5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
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5x5 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
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5x5 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
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5x5 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
 
 
5x5 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
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5x5 Square Graph (Zipfian=0.85): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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10x10 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
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10x10 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
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10x10 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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10x10 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
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10x10 Square Graph (Zipfian=0.65): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
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10x10 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
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10x10 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
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10x10 Square Graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
 
 
10x10 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
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10x10 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
 
10x10 Square Graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
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10x10 Square Graph (Zipfian=0.85): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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Gnutella 6301 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
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Gnutella 6301 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
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Gnutella 6301 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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Gnutella 6301 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
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Gnutella 6301 node Graph (Zipfian=0.65): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
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Gnutella 6301 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
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Gnutella 6301 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2  
- 107 - 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
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Gnutella 6301 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
 
 
Gnutella 6301 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
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Gnutella 6301 node Graph (Zipfian=0.85): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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Gnutella 8846 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
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Gnutella 8846 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
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Gnutella 8846 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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Gnutella 8846 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
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Gnutella 8846 node Graph (Zipfian=0.65): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
- 115 - 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
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Gnutella 8846 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
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Gnutella 8846 node graph. FIFO. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 1 
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Gnutella 8846 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 2 
 
 
Gnutella 8846 node graph. Random. Zipfian = 0.85. Request rate of 4 
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Gnutella 8846 node Graph (Zipfian=0.85): Percentage Increase Statistics 
 
 
Smart Attack Results. 5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 1 
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Smart Attack Results. 5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 2 
 
 
Smart Attack Results. 5x5 Square Graph. LRU. Zipfian = 0.65. Request rate of 4 
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